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Abstract 
We identify the impact of local firm concentration on incumbent performance with a quasi 
natural experiment. When Germany was divided after World War II, many firms in the 
machine tool industry fled the Soviet occupied zone to prevent expropriation. We show that 
the regional location decisions of these firms upon moving to western Germany were driven 
by non-economic factors and heuristics rather than existing industrial conditions. Relocating 
firms increased the likelihood of incumbent failure in destination regions, a pattern that 
differs sharply from new entrants. We further provide evidence that these effects are due to 
increased competition for local resources.  
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1. Introduction 
A common theme in economic geography is that increasing returns to scale at the 
local level are essential for explaining the geographical distribution of economic activity. 
Many industries have product markets that are national or international in scope, and one 
typically finds the firms of those industries tightly clustered together in specialized 
regions or clusters (e.g., automobiles in Detroit, finance in London). These geographic 
agglomerations of similar firms offer benefits to each member firm by reducing the 
transportation costs for material goods, specialized workers, and industry knowledge 
among the firms. Increasing returns are further generated through shared local inputs, 
indivisible facilities, better matching possibilities due to thicker markets, and so on.
1
 
Of course, tight geographic concentration comes with countervailing costs as firms 
compete for local inputs. This competition is most frequently expressed in rental prices 
and wage rates that differ both across local areas and across districts within a specific 
region. With this pricing, it is not certain that the increased benefits to incumbents from 
additional firm concentration will maintain pace with growing input costs, or vice versa. 
The effect of increased local agglomeration on incumbent firm performance is thus 
ambiguous. In the extreme, greater competition for scarce local inputs can force some 
incumbent firms out of business even when product markets are very broad in scope. 
                                                 
1 Marshall (1920) first outlined many of the rationales for industrial agglomerations. Duranton and Puga 
(2004) and Glaeser (2008) document the microeconomic foundations of agglomeration economies, and 
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the corresponding empirical evidence. Rosenthal and Strange (2001, 
2003) and Ellison et al. (2010) provide recent empirical analyses of the relative strengths of agglomeration 
forces, and Dauth (2011) considers agglomeration forces in Germany. 
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This paper is an empirical investigation of the impact of increased local concentration 
on incumbent firms. Causal identification in this setting is quite challenging due to 
selection effects. Economic models typically begin with rational entrants that are forming 
expectations about the relative costs and benefits of locations and choosing the best 
candidate. This location choice process suggests that simple empirical correlations of 
changes in local firm concentration and incumbent firm performance or survival are 
likely to be biased from the true relationship. For example, high entry rates may reflect 
short-term spatial disequilibria with favorable benefit/cost ratios. The latter conditions 
can independently promote incumbent firm performance and survival, and the adverse 
impact of new entrants on input conditions for local incumbents are likely to be 
dampened in these opportunistic settings. 
This endogeneity problem can be overcome with random assignment of locations to 
entrants. One situation in which location choice is quasi random arises when the entrant 
has incomplete information about locations. The entrant will first use available 
information to limit the choice set of potential locations. However, after removing weak 
contenders, the entrant will be indifferent among observationally equivalent locations and 
hence choose randomly among the finalists. This idea drives the identification strategy in 
the pivotal work of Greenstone et al. (2010), who analyze the effect of opening a large 
manufacturing plant on the productivity of incumbent firms in the local region. In their 
setting, the location choice for a new plant by an expanding firm begins with a detailed 
review of dozens of possible locations. This review process, however, yields several top 
candidates that are often very difficult to choose among. This ambiguity makes the final 
location decision effectively random among these top candidates. 
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A second setting that overcomes the selection bias is where location choice is driven 
by non-economic factors. If decisions are made exclusively according to factors that are 
orthogonal to local industrial conditions, the assignment of entrants can be treated as 
random for incumbents. Such experimental variation is rare in regional economics and 
cannot be generated in controlled experiments (Holmes, 2010). This form of random 
variation is very valuable, however, as randomized location choices are over all potential 
sites. When relying on economic decisions based upon substantial but ultimately 
incomplete information, as exemplified by Greenstone et al. (2010), tight comparisons 
are made amongst the best sites for an entrant. In principal, decisions due to non-
economic factors and/or extremely limited information offer a wide spectrum of sites that 
include (from a local business perspective) very good choices and very bad choices. 
This paper exploits one such quasi natural experiment—the division of Germany into 
four occupational zones after World War II. By 1949, the three western zones occupied 
by England, France, and the United States formed the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
eastern part developed into a satellite state of the Soviet Union, and most believed in 
1949 that this eastern zone would adopt the Soviet Union’s socialist system. The fear of 
expropriation (or worse) prompted many firm owners to flee to western Germany where 
they re-established their firms (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). 
We study this relocation in the context of the machine tool industry. Our data 
catalogue the entire population of German firms in the machine tool industry from 1949 
onwards, along with many pre-war conditions. This industry is a good setting to 
investigate these localized agglomeration and input competition effects. The industry’s 
product markets are international in scope, but its production processes benefit from 
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agglomeration economies due to specialized knowledge and workers, exchanges of 
material goods, and similar. The industry is characterized by strong manufacturer-user 
relationships that are the main impetus of innovation in this industry, and it largely 
consists of small and medium-size firms. While relatively small at 2% of German 
industrial production, the machine tool industry serves as an important foundation for the 
broader metalworking sector.
2
 
Moreover, the relocation of the machine tool industry from eastern to western 
Germany was quite substantial. We identify 33 relocators that fled from the Soviet zone 
to the American or British occupation zones. These 33 firms represent an 8% increase in 
total industry size for the receiving zones. At a regional level, the localized increases 
ranged from 0% and 200%, with an average of 11% for regions experiencing a relocation. 
In total, a fifth of the machine tool industry present in eastern Germany migrated during a 
narrow window of 1949-1956. This was a one-time event, as no prior or subsequent 
migrations occurred within the industry across German regions, eastern or western. 
Using conditional logit frameworks, we first show that these location choices were 
made with very little regard to existing business conditions across regions in western 
Germany. The general destruction of Germany during World War II and its subsequent 
division resulted in very little information, much less accurate information, about the 
current state or future plans for regions. Moreover, many migrations were made under 
extreme duress. Consequently, relocating firms did not undertake sophisticated location 
decisions, but instead based their destination choices on heuristics and non-economic 
                                                 
2 See Sciberras and Payne (1985), Ashburn (1988), Carlsson (1989), Lee (1996), Hirsch-Kreinsen (2000), 
and Arnold (2003). 
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factors. In particular, we show that greater cultural similarity and further geographic 
distances dominate economic factors in these decisions. 
Yet, upon arrival, these relocating firms substantially impacted local industrial 
conditions as the firms quickly regained much of their former production capacity 
(Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). On average, they survived more than 30 years at their 
new locations. We use hazard models to compare incumbent survival by region based 
upon the magnitude of this influx. We find that relocations significantly increased the 
likelihood of incumbent failure, which suggests that the costs of increased competition 
for local inputs dominated the potential benefits from agglomeration economies. By 
contrast, we find that new start-up entrants during the post war period—whose location 
choices were more opportunistic—were not associated with increased incumbent failure 
rates. These differences provide additional confidence in our experimental design. 
Finally, we further validate the resource constraint hypothesis by examining local 
workforce conditions after the war. In particular, western Germany experienced a 
contemporaneous inflow of about 8 million expellees who were exogenously distributed 
across local regions by the authorities of the occupation zones. These expellees were 
critical for rebuilding a German workforce devastated by the war. These expellee 
assignments were again orthogonal to the existing machine tool industry. As such, there 
exists great heterogeneity in workforce conditions across locations where relocations of 
machine tool firms occurred. We show that the increased failure rates of incumbents in 
western Germany due to relocating firms was concentrated in regions where labor forces 
were constrained due to low expellee inflows. In regions with a significant inflow of 
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expellees and favorable input conditions, there was no effect of relocations on incumbent 
firms’ risk of failure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the quasi 
natural experiment in greater detail, and Section 3 introduces our data on the German 
machine tool industry. Section 4 analyzes the location choice problem for firms 
relocating from East Germany. Section 5 examines the impacts of relocating firms for 
incumbents. We conclude with some implications in Section 6. 
 
2. Industrial relocation from the Russian zone as a natural experiment 
After World War II, Germany was initially separated into four occupational zones 
that were independently administered by France, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union. In the years following World War II, differences in ideology 
between the three ―western‖ administrations and the Soviet Union led to a second, lasting 
separation of Germany. The western part evolved into a federal parliamentary republic 
with a market-oriented economy, and the socialist eastern part adopted the Soviet system 
of a planned economy. The partition became quasi official in May 1949 when the three 
western zones were merged into an independent state, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), and the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) in October 1949. Even though the West German Constitution considered the 
two-state solution as an artificial status quo, reunification was not expected in the short 
term. To this end, West Germany began massive investment in developing the 
infrastructure and housing supply for its new capital of Bonn. 
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As it became clear that the separation was semi-permanent and that East Germany 
was adopting a Soviet system, many East Germans looked west in search of political 
freedom and economic prosperity. More than 2.5 million people fled East Germany to 
resettle in West Germany prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
Among the refugees from East Germany were thousands of business owners whose 
firms were threatened with socialization. Recognizing the costs of these firm migrations, 
East Germany continually strengthened border controls to prevent a large-scale outflow 
of productive capital and knowledge, and thus most business relocations were secretly 
planned and quickly executed. As a consequence, it was impossible for these owners to 
collect or analyze detailed information about potential locations in West Germany. 
Moreover, any available information had very little content for decision making due to 
vast destruction during World War II and the subsequent dismantling of many 
undestroyed production facilities (Laske, 1995; Mazzoleni, 1997). For most decisions, 
existing industrial structures were simply not known. 
The expropriation and dismantling of machine tool producers in the Soviet zone was 
largely based on a referendum held on 30 June 1946. The referendum approved the 
expropriation of all Nazis and war criminals, a group that included firm owners who 
engaged in or were related to the production of armaments. Given that the whole machine 
tool industry was somehow involved in the production of armaments, most owners were 
subsequently expropriated and their firms were socialized. 
Three case studies of firms originally located in the Chemnitz region of East Germany 
illustrate the setting. In response to the expropriation threat, the owners and managers of 
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the Wanderer Corporation called an extraordinary general meeting in Munich where they 
decided to relocate the company to that city. This was done quickly, and the company 
continued producing among others milling machines and machine tools at their new 
location from 1949 onwards. Pfauter Co. was a producer of machine tools used in gear 
production that was established in Chemnitz in 1900. At the end of World War II, the 
firm was being run by the founder’s four sons. Feeling threatened by the Soviet 
occupation, three of the Pfauter brothers and some loyal employees moved the company 
to Stuttgart in 1949. The fourth brother was detained by the Soviets. A final, prominent 
example comes from outside of our machine tool industry sample. Auto Union 
Corporation relocated to Ingolstadt where it ultimately developed into the very successful 
car producer Audi (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). 
All together, the separation of Germany was a hard blow for the machine tool 
industry. Prior to World War II, almost 30% of Germany’s machine tool manufacturers 
were located in the eastern part of Germany that was to become the Soviet zone after the 
war. This separation of the former centers of the industry, especially around Chemnitz, 
Leipzig, and Dresden in Saxony, as well as East Berlin, resulted in a 41% reduction of 
production capacity as compared to 1938 (Schwab, 1996). 
 
3. The German machine tool industry 
Our data come from the buyer’s guide Who Makes Machinery (Wer baut Maschinen), 
which has been issued annually since the 1930s by the Association of the German 
Machine Tool Producers (Verein Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau). This source 
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allows identification of the entire firm population of 2,267 machine tool producers in 
West Germany from 1949-2002.
3
 Machine tool producers are defined as producers of 
power-driven machines that are used to produce a given work piece by cutting, forming, 
or shaping metal (Wieandt, 1994). 
Based on the 1936-1943 volumes of Who Makes Machinery, we identify 394 
incumbent firms with pre-war experience in the British or American zones. We exclude 
the French zone from our analysis because the dismantling of production facilities within 
this zone eliminated almost all incumbent production facilities. The first three columns of 
Table 1 provide statistics for these incumbents by region within each occupational zone.  
The listed regions are officially defined as ―planning regions‖. These regions are 
functional economic units formed on the basis of commuter distances. Many 
agglomeration forces find their strongest expression at this geographic level, making this 
spatial unit ideal for our analysis.
4
 The average number of incumbents in the 40 regions 
was ten, with a median of four incumbents. The three largest centers were Düsseldorf, 
Stuttgart, and Bochum/Hagen. 
Product counts are our best estimate of firm size (Franco and Filson, 2006; Klepper 
and Thompson, 2006). We are able to distinguish 36 types of products (e.g., turning, 
boring, or grinding machines) from three major product classes: metal cutting, metal 
forming, or special purpose machine tools. The average number of product types for 
                                                 
3 Only one catalogue was issued for 1949/1950, and the 1952 catalogue was not archived. We approximate 
1952 with conditions in 1951 for our empirical work. 
4 See Rosenthal and Strange (2001), Duranton and Overman (2005), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), Fu and 
Ross (2010), Ellison et al. (2010), and Kerr and Kominers (2010) for related work on spatial distances for 
agglomeration forces. For recent work on labor markets and agglomeration, see Diamond and Simon 
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incumbent firms in 1949 was 1.7, and the average number of product variants (sub-types 
of products) was 3.0. The most important product class varied across regions within each 
zone. 
We further identify from the earlier records 33 machine tool producers that were 
originally located in eastern Germany (28 firms) or Silesia/Prussia (5 firms) but relocated 
their business activities after the war to either the British or American zones of West 
Germany. These 33 companies constituted about 6% of the overall firm population in 
1938 at the beginning of World War II. Furthermore, these companies did not differ in 
terms of the number of products they produced in 1938 from those firms that stayed 
(Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). 
Columns 4-6 of Table 1 describe relocators’ destination regions, their years of 
relocation, and the number of products that they start with at their new location. The 
number of product types after relocation of 1.4 was a decline from the pre-war capacity 
of these firms, but they quickly expanded upon relocation. Over the first ten years, 
relocators achieved a mean of 2.18 product types. The average of their max sizes is 3.15 
products.
5
 
Columns 7-9 describe the level of start-up entrants in these regions. In total, 1,332 
firms entered these regions in the post war period to 2002. The average entrant has 1.3 
product types. Approximately 54% of these entrants survived for five years or longer, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1990), Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), Fallick et al. (2006), Menon (2009), and Overman and Puga (2010). 
Delgado et al. (2010) and Glaeser et al. (2010) provide recent analyses of local cluster performance. 
5 We identified 43 relocators in total. We require that relocators in our sample survive for five years after 
relocating. This restriction excludes a few marginal cases where it is not certain the extent to which the 
relocator resumed production. Two relocators from Silesia move to regions without incumbent firms 
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39% survived for ten years. Many of these entrants (44%) entered during the same time 
period as the relocations, before 1956. Of these early entrants, 53% and 41% survived for 
five and ten years, respectively. 
Visually, the table suggests that relocations and entries have moderate spatial overlap 
at most. In absolute terms, Düsseldorf and Stuttgart are the top locations on both lists 
reflecting their greater shares of the industry as a whole. But there exists extensive 
variation otherwise. For example, Berlin had the third most entrants but only one 
relocation from the surrounding eastern Germany regions. The start-up overlay was 
closer to existing incumbent structures.
6
 One way to quantify the spatial overlap is to 
normalize relocation and entrant counts by initial incumbent activity after the war. The 
spatial correlation of these normalized measures for relocations and entrants is just 0.2. 
This independence allows us to analyze these two phenomena jointly. 
 
4. Location decisions of relocating firms from the Soviet zone 
We analyze the location choice problem of relocators from the Soviet zone to either 
the American or British zones with conditional logit models. We have ten source regions 
in the Soviet occupation zone and 63 potential destination regions (40 with incumbents 
after World War II) in the American and British zones. For this analysis, we only 
consider relocations from eastern Germany as we do not have pre-war traits on conditions 
in Silesia/Prussia. The latter are, however, included in the survival analysis in Section 5. 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Oberland and Regensburg). These firms are effectively excluded from our sample as well. Finally, we drop 
three relocations within Berlin that are difficult to interpret. 
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The conditional logit estimations include fixed effects for potential destination 
regions. These effects capture traits of destination regions that are common to relocators 
from all source regions. Examples would include general economic activity in the region, 
the number of surviving incumbents, and so on. Beyond these traits that we could 
potentially measure today (e.g., Düsseldorf’s size in 1949), these effects also capture 
many unobserved characteristics or expectations of regions that existed in the uncertain 
environment after World War II. 
After controlling for these destination effects, we test attributes about destination 
regions that are unique to origin regions. We characterize three factors that are specific to 
origin-destination pairs. The first is naturally geographic distance, although distance 
carries two potential effects in this context. First, greater distance raised the costs of 
relocations. On the other hand, further distance might have been advantageous to the 
extent that firms relocated further away from the uncertainties that surrounded the border. 
Our second measure is how similar the machine tool industries are in the origin and 
potential destination region. This factor tests the extent to which industrial structures 
factored into decisions. Our measure is a count measure of product similarity across 36 
different product types. We measure product types that were being produced in the origin 
region in eastern Germany before World War II in 1936. We do the same for potential 
destination regions in West Germany in 1949.
7
 Our measure is the sum of product type 
matches between the two regions, which describes the similarity of conditions for 
entrants. 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Holmes and Stevens (2002), Glaeser and Kerr (2009), and Rosenthal and Strange (2010) discuss entrant 
spatial distributions and existing incumbents for the US. 
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This measure is calculated by region pairs. By contrast, we purposefully do not 
compare the relocator’s product portfolio when starting at the new location to the 
incumbent firms’ product portfolios in the potential destination regions. The relocator’s 
product portfolio might be endogenous to the location decision itself. 
Our third metric tests the role of non-economic factors and heuristics in these 
decisions. Following Falck et al. (2010b), we measure cultural similarity between two 
regions as the similarity between the historical dialects spoken. Extensive research in 
economics ties heightened social and economic interactions to ethnic, genetic, and 
linguistic bonds.
8
 In this study’s context, dialect similarity partly represents familiarity 
with norms and conventions of the potential destination region. It may also reflect distant 
family ties. With such uncertainty about economic conditions in potential destinations, 
these non-economic factors may have been especially important in decisions. 
Linguist Georg Wenker conducted a unique survey of dialects between 1879 and 
1888 at 45,000 schools across the German Empire. The resulting data, which contains 
almost 300 attributes of dialects by region, afford very fine grained comparisons of the 
dialect connections between locations. Falck et al. (2010b) construct a dialect similarity 
matrix. This work further demonstrates that these dialect connections persist even to 
present in migration flows. We use their metrics for the cultural similarity of origin 
locations in eastern Germany and potential destinations in West Germany. 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 We find similar results when using 1936 traits for potential destination regions, but we believe it is 
conceptually better to use conditions after the war. 
8 For example, Lazear (1999), Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kerr (2008), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), and 
Guiso et al. (2009). Falck et al. (2010b) provide more extended references. See also the experimental 
results on status quo tendencies of Kahneman et al. (1991). 
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Figure 1 illustrates the location choice of the seven relocators from the region of 
Chemnitz-Ore Mountains in eastern Germany. The shading of the left map reflects the 
dialect similarity of the 63 regions in the American (solid outline) and British occupation 
zones with the Chemnitz region. Darker shading indicates higher dialect similarity. The 
shading of the right map reflects the product similarity between the Chemnitz region and 
potential destinations. Darker shading again indicates greater similarity. 
The first observation is that distance is a factor in that the seven firms migrated 
farther into West Germany than random. Second, the chosen destination regions tended to 
have strong dialect similarity with Chemnitz—four of the seven cases fall into the highest 
two levels, and none of the selected regions has below average dialect similarity. On the 
other hand, there is not a consistent pattern for product similarity, with a wide mixture of 
high and low similarities present. 
Table 2 extends this visual analysis to all relocations using conditional logit models 
(McFadden, 1973). To aid in interpretation, we standardize our three similarity metrics to 
have zero mean and unit standard deviation. The base location choice model has 1,759 
observations
9
, and we report bootstrapped standard errors.
10
 The Chemnitz patterns hold 
generally. Geographic distance was a very strong factor, with relocators favoring more 
distant regions. This suggests that short-term transportation costs were less important 
                                                 
9 Crossing 63 regions with 28 relocators yields a total potential sample count of 1,764. We have five cases 
of a firm in the eastern part of Berlin relocating, and we do not allow for firms to relocate within Berlin by 
construction (we have dropped the three cases where this occurred; see footnote 5). For these five cases, the 
choice set is restricted to 62 potential regions. 
10 We find very similar results when clustering standard errors by origin or destination region. Bootstrapped 
standard errors are the smallest standard errors on the product similarity regressor among the variants, thus 
providing the most difficult bar for showing that industrial conditions did not matter for location choice.  
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than establishing new locations farther from the border. Dialect or cultural similarity was 
also a strong factor, with strength similar to geographic distance.  
On the other hand, product similarity did not play role in these decisions. It is 
important to note that our product similarity measure is not insignificant due just to 
imprecise estimates. Its standard errors are consistently larger than the standard errors for 
distance or dialect similarity. But, the point estimates for the economic importance of 
incumbent structures are also much lower. Both of these give us confidence that location 
choices were primarily made due to factors orthogonal to incumbent industrial structures.       
Column 2 finds similar results when restricting the sample to relocators that survived 
at least ten years in their new location in West Germany. In general, it does not appear 
that relocation choices were motivated differently among relocators with short versus 
long subsequent life spans. 
Finally, Columns 3 and 4 conduct tests of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption by restricting the set of alternative potential destinations. We first consider 
the actual destination region along with ten counterfactual regions that are most similar to 
the actual destination region in terms of population density. Beyond origin-destination 
similarity for the machine tool industry itself, these urban conditions could have been 
meaningful for relocation decisions due to infrastructure needs and similar factors. This 
choice set restriction does not change the greater importance given to distance and 
dialect/cultural similarity. 
Column 4 alternatively restricts counterfactual regions to just those that bordered the 
actual destination region. This restriction removes the distance and dialect variation, but 
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it allows us to test very narrowly the product similarity index. Relocators continue to 
select regions with very limited attention to incumbent industrial structures even among 
regions that neighbor their true choice. 
To summarize, both the case studies and empirical models indicate that existing 
incumbent structures across regions were not a major factor in the location choices of 
firms fleeing East Germany. Instead, non-economic factors like greater distance and 
dialect similarity dominated. This provides confidence that these relocations provided 
quasi random exogenous shocks to the local machine tool industries. We next turn to the 
impact of these shocks on the performance of incumbent firms. 
 
5. The effect of relocators on incumbent survival 
5.1. Empirical strategy 
We estimate the effect of relocated firms from the Soviet zone on incumbent survival 
in the affected West German regions. These firms were quite different from start-ups as 
they brought with them (to varying degrees) industry experience and technical 
knowledge, networks of domestic and foreign customers, portfolios of existing products, 
and similar assets that could be built upon in their new locations. Indeed, these relocated 
firms recovered quickly and developed to be as successful as local incumbents. This 
group has been taken as evidence for persistent organizational capabilities of firms that 
are independent of a single spatial location (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). 
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The large magnitudes of these random shocks, along with the localized variations in 
resource constraints for workers that are discussed below, provide a fruitful laboratory for 
comparing beneficial agglomeration economies versus adverse competition for localized 
inputs.
11
 Importantly, our empirical setting is also free of variations in local demand to a 
first approximation. Machine tools are an intermediate input to other firms, and domestic 
and international trade are central to the machine tool industry and its wide product 
markets (Carlsson, 1989). In 1913, Germany was the world’s largest exporter of machine 
tools, with a value of US$176 million compared to the US’ exports of US$162 million at 
that time (Labuske and Streb, 2008). Richter and Streb (2009) describe the sophisticated 
and innovative nature of the industry in the period just prior to World War II. After 
World War II, the German machine tool industry quickly regained its international 
competitiveness. The industry exported 48% of its total production during the 1954-1963 
period (Buenstorf and Guenther, 2011). 
We begin our survival estimations with 1949. This is several years after the 1945 
German surrender, but it took some time after World War II for the industry to 
reorganize. War crime prosecutions lasted until 1949, and industrial production was 
controlled by occupational forces during the interim. Heavy machine tool production was 
entirely prohibited immediately after the war, and other fields were severely restricted. 
                                                 
11 For example, a particularly simple representation of firm optimization with one input takes the form 
p•g(n)•f(l)-w(n)•l-c, where f(l) is a concave production technology in the input l and c is a fixed cost of 
operation that are specific to firm i. The size of the industry in the local area is n. The price of output p is 
determined by national or international product markets and is exogenous to the local area. The function 
g(n) is a reduced-form expression of agglomeration economies that is increasing in n. The function w(n) 
similarly represents the impact of greater local industry size on input prices. Depending upon the 
underlying model, local industry growth may raise productivity due to agglomeration economies, raise 
input prices due to resource competition, or both. Shut-down conditions for incumbents (participation 
constraints) and first order conditions for optimal firm size depend upon the relative strengths of these 
effects. See Greenstone et al. (2010) for a more extended discussion of this theoretical backdrop. 
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Machine tool production in West Germany began to recover in 1949 with the signing of 
the Petersburg Agreement, which set the framework for West German sovereignty and a 
new market-based economy (Schwab, 1996). 1949 also marked a clear recognition that 
the future paths of East and West Germany would differ substantially, which began the 
rush to relocate. 
Figures 2 and 3 present descriptive evidence on the differences between relocating 
firms and new entrants. In Figure 2, we divide West German regions into three groups: 
those regions that experienced no relocations from the Soviet zone, those that 
experienced moderate rates of relocation, and those that experienced high rates. Rates of 
relocation are determined by the number of relocators relative to the existing incumbent 
stock, and the high group includes those regions with ratios higher than the mean ratio for 
regions that experienced at least one relocation. 
Within a few years of the final relocation, a persistent difference in failure rates opens 
between incumbents in regions that experienced relocations and those that did not. This 
difference only closes itself after a period of 40 years. Moreover, looking within regions 
that experienced relocation, the failure rates are consistently higher for incumbents that 
are in regions that experienced high rates of relocations relative to incumbents located in 
regions that experienced moderate rates.  
Figure 3, on the other hand, shows a very different pattern with new entrants. To 
match our relocation sample as closely as possible, we consider entrants during the period 
of the relocations that also survived five years. As every region with incumbents has new 
entrants during the relocation period, we divide the sample into three equal-sized groups 
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based upon the rates of entry relative to the incumbent stock. Failure rates are in the 
opposite pattern from Figure 2. Incumbents in regions with the highest entry rates have 
the lowest failure rates, while incumbents in regions with the lowest entry rates have the 
highest failure rates. As the introduction noted, new entrants made their entry decisions 
and location choices much more opportunistically than the relocations, for example 
responding to short-term spatial disequilibria with favorable benefit/cost ratios. This 
contrast with the relocations is very stark. 
To more systematically quantify how relocators and entrants affected incumbent 
survival, we analyze a proportional Cox hazard model (Cox, 1972), 
)exp()()|( 100 itirtrttri XRERZthth   , 
where )|( thi is the hazard rate or risk of failure of incumbent firm i located in region r at 
time t conditional on a set of regressors. )(0 th is the unspecified baseline hazard function. 
We take into consideration the fact that incumbent firms have been at risk of failure since 
their founding, even though we do not analyze their survival before 1949.
12
 Some of the 
incumbent firms are still active today. We relate these hazard functions to relocations and 
start-up entry in the incumbents’ planning regions. 
rtRZ  is a count variable of relocations to a region. In our first specification, we treat 
each relocator with the same weight, such that rtRZ  is the cumulative count of relocating 
firms to region r by time t. In our second approach, we weight the importance of 
relocators by their size at entry, which is proxied by initial product type counts upon 
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relocation. The coefficient of interest is 0  or )exp( 0 . The latter is the proportional 
change in the incumbent firm’s hazard rate resulting from the relocation of a firm from 
the Soviet zone to region r. rtRE  is a symmetrical treatment for entering start-up firms.  
We include time fixed effects t  to capture aggregate changes in hazard rates 
common to regions. These are due, for example, to German business cycles or industry 
trends for machine tools. The region fixed effects r  control for regional variation in the 
baseline hazard rate due to factors like fixed agglomeration externalities, natural 
advantages, or local policies. 
Finally, we include two firm-specific covariates. The first of these is the number of 
product types an incumbent firm supplied in 1949, where we consider a firm’s product 
variety as a good proxy for firm size (Franco and Filson, 2006; Klepper and Thompson, 
2006). Larger initial firm size and product variety reduced the likelihood of firm failure. 
The second trait is the incumbent’s major product class in 1949, as technology areas and 
industries differed in the expected longevity of businesses (Sciberras and Payne, 1985). 
 
5.2 Basic survival results 
Tables 3 and 4 report the basic hazard estimations. We report proportional changes 
for the hazard ratio, )exp( . Coefficients larger than one signify an increased risk of 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 We lack founding years for some incumbents. We therefore use the year of first appearance in the survey 
(between 1936 and 1949) as the time at which a firm becomes at risk of failure. Our results are robust 
across various modelling strategies with respect to this timing. 
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failure, while values less than one signify decreased risk. We cluster standard errors by 
region, and statistical significance is measured relative to 1)exp(  . 
Table 3 uses the firm count approach. Additional relocations to a region significantly 
raised the hazard of failure for local incumbents. One additional relocation was associated 
with a 25% higher likelihood of firm failure compared to the baseline. This effect 
contrasts sharply with the coefficient for start-up entrants. Start-up entrants were 
associated with a very small decline in incumbent hazard rates. The linear differences 
between the relocation and entry effects are statistically significant. 
Columns 2-6 refine this assessment by contrasting the relocation response with 
different sets of start-up entrants. First, many start-ups are short-lived, with 45% of 
entrants to the machine tool industry failing before five years. Columns 2 and 3 restrict 
entrants to those that survived at least five or ten years, respectively. These entrants were 
perhaps more comparable in quality to the relocated firms, at least over a medium 
horizon, but the difference persists. Column 4-6 repeat these specifications restricting 
start-up entrants to the period before 1956. With this restriction, the window for new 
entrants matches the period in which the relocations occurred. The results are similar, 
suggesting that the effective time periods across types are not driving our results. 
While proportional effects are most accurately estimated, Table 1 shows that there 
were many more entrants than relocators. A crude calculation of applying the marginal 
effects to the total numbers of each type during 1949-2002 suggests that these aggregate 
effects of relocators and entrants are comparable in economic magnitude. This 
comparability is remarkable given the very short window in which these relocations 
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occurred. Restricting to entrants during the period before 1956, the magnitude of the 
relocation effects are about twice that of new entrants. Buenstorf and Guenther (2011) 
demonstrate that relocated firms recovered quickly and became as successful as local 
incumbents, so these firms are clearly a distinct group from typical entrants. 
Table 4 repeats this battery of specifications using initial product type counts to 
weight the importance of relocators and entrants. The pattern of results is very similar to 
Table 3, with the more refined variation yielding more precisely estimated effects. The 
average relocator had 1.42 product types at entry. This mean entrant would yield a 22% 
increase in incumbent failure, which is slightly less than the mean effect of 25% in 
Table 3. This differential suggests that larger reallocations may have had disproportionate 
effects, but that the non-linearities would be second order in importance. Along these 
lines, unreported specifications find evidence that relocations of larger firms had 
additional effects for incumbent failure, but these differences are not statistically 
significant. This may in part descend from the fact that many relocators with small initial 
product type counts were able to restore production capacity quickly upon arrival. 
These results are robust to a variety of further specification variants. For example, we 
find similar patterns when including pre-trends for regions or interactions of product class 
and year fixed effects. Adjustments to the sample window also do not influence the 
results. We find comparable outcomes when testing simpler indicator variables for pre-
post relocations to a region. Across multiple techniques, the higher incumbent failure rate 
following relocations emerges with a generally consistent economic magnitude. 
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These survival estimations focus on the extensive margin of incumbent performance. 
We also undertook unreported specifications of product type counts of incumbents to 
model the intensive margin for surviving incumbents. The historical nature of our data 
limit us from calculating detailed productivity measures, but product type counts and 
survival are often closely linked to productivity (Griliches and Regev, 1995). 
Effects on the intensive margin were much smaller and generally sensitive to 
specification choice. One exception was (not surprisingly) a strong, sharp decline in 
product types for failing incumbents immediately before exit. A second result pointed to 
increased product variants for surviving incumbents following relocations. Nevertheless, 
our general conclusions from this extended analysis are that extensive margin effects for 
incumbent survival were much more important than intensive margin differences for 
surviving incumbents. 
 
5.3 Exploring the source of input competition in the local labor market 
As a final step, we investigate more closely the input competition mechanism. The 
German labor force was devastated by the war, and a very important factor in rebuilding 
this labor force was the distribution of expellees (Falck et al., 2011). Expellees were 
German citizens or ethnic Germans who lived within the eastern German borders as they 
existed between 1917–1937 or in Austria-Hungary before or during the war (§1, Federal 
Expellee Law, 19 May 1953). Late in World War II, these individuals were forced by the 
Soviet Red Army to leave their homelands and settle within the new borders of Germany 
or Austria. This expulsion was furthered by the Potsdam Treaty. Almost 12 million ethnic 
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Germans fled or were expelled from their homes in East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, East 
Brandenburg, and the Sudetenland to find refuge in other German states. 
Expellees had little choice in where they were settled, being generally distributed 
across regions based on the availability of food and housing by the authorities. These 
often tended to be more rural locations. At first, it was difficult for the expellees to work. 
For example, their formal qualifications were frequently not recognized as valid. 
However, West Germany enacted the Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) 
in 1953 that regulated the expellees’ status and granted them full access to the local labor 
market. This exogenous push provides important variation in local workforce conditions. 
Competition for employees was weaker in planning regions with a higher influx of 
expellees. Moreover, the differences across regions were quite substantial. The last 
column in Table 1 shows the variation in expellee shares. Data are available in eight bins 
from the Bundesminster fuer Heimatvertriebene (1950). Eight of the 40 planning regions 
in our incumbent sample had an expellee influx of less than 10%. On the other hand, five 
zones had an influx greater than 30%. 
We group regions into three buckets based upon these expellee shares. Low shares are 
[0,10%], medium shares are (10%, 20%], and high shares are those greater than 20%. 
These three groups are of equal size with respect to the number of relocations. Moreover, 
each of these buckets contains one of the three largest destinations for relocations. 
Düsseldorf is among the lowest shares, Rhine-Main is in the middle bucket, and Stuttgart 
is among the highest shares. This extensive variation is a fortunate byproduct of the 
exogenous circumstances driving both the spatial distributions of machine tool 
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relocations and of expellees. The spatial correlation of the expellee shares and the 
machine tool relocations is -0.19.
 13
 
Table 5 shows that the impact of relocating firms on incumbent survival was 
particular strong in regions with lower labor influx due to expellees. Columns 1-3 use 
firm counts to model firm inflows similar to Table 3, while Columns 4-6 use the product 
type counts method of Table 4. The first and fourth columns demonstrate this pattern for 
the full sample. These regions with low labor influx experienced the fiercest competition 
for labor, and the effect of relocations on incumbent survival was twice the sample 
average. The increase in the incumbents’ risk of failure is somewhat smaller in the 
intermediate group of regions. Most importantly, there was no increase in failure among 
the regions with the largest expellee influx. The estimations in Table 5 jointly measure 
these effects, and we find similar results when separately considering each group of 
expellee shares. 
The second and fifth column also show these results hold when restricting the sample 
to regions with moderate population density. We undertake this robustness check due to 
the tilt towards rural areas in expellee distributions. There are insufficient observations 
among regions with moderate population densities to estimate the low expellee effect, but 
we are able to compare the middle and high expellee regions. This is effectively a 
matching exercise among areas of comparable population density, and the estimations 
                                                 
13 The labor shortages the 1950s and 1960s were extreme. Their severity lead Germany to negotiate guest 
worker agreements from 1955 on with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and 
Yugoslavia. Until the end of these agreements in 1973, nearly three million guest workers came to West 
Germany. These guest workers mostly worked as unskilled workers in manufacturing, similar to expellees 
(Falck et al., 2011). The post-war census shows that the spatial correlation of the share of guest workers 
and expellees is significantly negative. This is evidence that regions that experienced a relatively large 
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show that the risk of failure was larger in the regions that experienced less of an expellee 
labor inflow. The third and sixth columns also show comparable results when using 
entrant counts before 1956. These estimations suggest that resource constraints were 
particularly important in how relocations impacted incumbents. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The relocation of the machine tool industry from the Soviet zone of post war 
Germany to western regions is a unique laboratory for studying the impact of industrial 
structures on incumbent survival. The quasi random nature of the location decisions by 
migrating owners—driven mostly by non-economic factors and undertaken hastily due to 
extreme duress—offers an exogenous shock to local industries that is rare in economic 
geography. We find that relocations increased a local incumbent’s risk of failure by a 
factor of 1.25. These effects were particularly acute in locations with constrained labor 
resources; they also differ substantially from more opportunistic entrants. 
Though based on an historic natural experiment, these results are very relevant to 
current academic and policy discussions on the long-term impacts of firm location 
decisions, which often require substantial investments and create future path 
dependencies. Many local leaders argue for incentives to attract large firms to their region 
(Greenstone et al., 2010). This may no longer take the explicit form of ―smokestack 
chasing‖ for manufacturing firms, but instead often targets healthcare firms, services 
companies, or similar large employers in favored sectors (Falck et al., 2010a).  
                                                                                                                                                 
inflow of expellees were—at least in the 1950s and early 1960s—less constrained in their economic 
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Regional planners frequently invoke agglomeration economies or cluster formation to 
promote these efforts to attract large firms. Planners must be aware that the impact of 
these policies for incumbent firms can differ sharply from measured effects for efforts to 
promote start-up firms in a region. Incumbents may be displaced if local resources are 
tight, even if beneficial agglomeration economies increase. This negative impact can 
spillover onto the incumbent’s workers as well, if labor market frictions lead to sustained 
unemployment for displaced workers. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate 
whether this kind of competition is beneficial overall from a welfare perspective (in the 
sense of Schumpeter’s creative destruction), but we hope to highlight that negative effects 
can exist and that the absorption capacity of the region for a large relocation needs to be 
carefully evaluated.  
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Notes:  Figure demonstrates the location choice of the seven relocators from the region of Chemnitz-Ore Mountains in eastern Germany. The shading of the 
left map reflects the dialect similarity of the 63 regions in the American (solid outline) and British occupation zones with the Chemnitz region. Darker 
shading indicates higher dialect similarity. The shading of the right map reflects the product similarity between the Chemnitz region and potential 
destinations. Darker shading again indicates greater similarity. Distance is a factor in that the seven firms migrated farther into West Germany than random. 
Second, the chosen destination regions tended to have strong dialect similarity with Chemnitz, while there is not a consistent pattern for product similarity. 
Figure 1:  Relocation patterns to West Germany from Chemnitz region 
Dialect-Cultural 
Similarity to 
Chemnitz 
Industrial 
Similarity to 
Chemnitz 
Notes:  Figure documents the Kaplan-Meier failure rates for incumbent machine tool firms. Regions are grouped into three bins: those with high rates of 
relocating firms from eastern Germany to the region, those with moderate rates of relocating firms, and those with no relocating firms. Rates of relocation are 
determined by the number of relocating firms divided by the incumbent machine tool firms in the region. High rates are those regions above the mean ratio 
for regions that experience a relocation.  The first six years of analysis time is the period in which the relocations occur. High rates of relocating firms are 
associated with greater failure rates for incumbent firms. 
Figure 2:  Failure estimates of incumbents by degree of relocation 
No relocations 
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Notes:  Figure documents the Kaplan-Meier failure rates for incumbent machine tool firms. Regions are grouped into three bins: those with high rates of 
entry over 1949-1955, those with moderate rates of entry, and those with low rates of entry. Rates of entry are determined by the number of entrants that 
survive for five years divided by the incumbent machine tool firms in the region. The first six years of analysis time represents the period in which these 
entry rates are measured, equivalent to relocations documented in Figure 2. While high rates of relocating firms are associated with greater failure rates, the 
opposite is true for new entrants. 
Figure 3:  Failure estimates of incumbents by degree of entry 
Lowest entry 
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East Germany 
Total Products / Dominant Total Date Products / Total Number Total Population Expellee
incumbent variants product relocator ranges of variants entrant surviving entrants density share of
firm per firm class firm relocations per firm firm for 5 / 10 before 1949 post war
count 1949 count 1949 count years 1956 (per km
2
) workforce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Bremen 1 2 / 4 Cutting 9 4 / 3 4 1371 0%-10%
Rhine-Main 25 1.8 / 2.5 Cutting 6 1951-1955 1.7 / 6.3 71 46 / 31 21 353 10%-15%
Starkenburg 4 1 / 2 Cutting 18 10 / 7 6 239 10%-15%
Upper Neckar 3 1 / 1 Cutting 2 1949-1951 1 / 4 17 6 / 5 13 292 15%-20%
Franconia 5 1.8 / 2.6 Cutting 20 13 / 11 9 123 15%-20%
Middle Upper Rhine 7 1.3 / 2.4 Cutting 1 1949 2 / 2 24 10 / 7 6 297 10%-15%
Northern Black Forest 11 1.5 / 2.5 Forming 58 30 / 25 38 141 10%-15%
Stuttgart 43 2.1 / 3.6 Cutting 5 1949-1955 1.2 / 1.6 136 86 / 57 56 407 20%-25%
Eastern Wuertemberg 2 1.5 / 1.5 Cutting 13 8 / 6 9 142 20%-25%
Bavarian Lower Main 2 2 / 2 Forming 15 10 / 7 4 173 10%-15%
Wurzburg 1 1 / 1 Cutting 5 5 / 3 2 131 15%-20%
Upper Franconia-W. 5 1.2 / 2.2 Forming 11 7 / 6 3 147 20%-25%
Central Franconia 15 1.4 / 2.1 Cutting 38 18 / 11 15 287 15%-20%
W. Central Franconia 1 1 / 1 Cutting 13 7 / 5 13 150 20%-25%
Landshut 2 2 / 2 Forming 2 1 / 1 2 100 25%-30%
Munich 5 2 / 3.6 Cutting 1 1951 3 / 5 47 24 / 18 11 278 20%-25%
Danube-Iller (BY) 1 1 / 5 Cutting 17 9 / 8 7 131 25%-30%
Allgaeu 2 1 / 2 Forming 11 7 / 6 3 103 20%-25%
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for machine tool industry in West Germany and East German relocations
Incumbents Relocators from East Germany New entrants Region
A. Planning Regions in the US Occupied Zone
Notes:  Incumbent traits describe existing firms in the planning region before the relocations began.  Dominate product classes refer to metal cutting and metal forming.  Relocator 
traits describe firms moving from East Germany.  Entrant traits describe new start-up firms that are not relocating from East Germany.
Total Products / Dominant Total Date Products / Total Number Total Population Expellee
incumbent variants product relocator ranges of variants entrant surviving entrants density share of
firm per firm class firm relocations per firm firm for 5 / 10 before 1949 post war
count 1949 count 1949 count years 1956 (per km
2
) workforce
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Schleswig-Holstein E. 2 1.5 / 1.5 Forming 9 2 / 1 8 278 30%-35%
Schleswig-Holstein S. 1 3 / 6 Forming 14 11 / 7 2 150 >35%
Hamburg 9 1.4 / 1.9 Forming 1 1955 1 / 1 40 25 / 18 16 2149 0%-10%
Hanover 4 1.25 / 2 Cutting 16 8 / 6 6 261 30%-35%
Brunswick 5 1 / 1 Forming 1 1953 1 / 1 16 8 / 7 12 205 30%-35%
Hildesheim 2 1 / 1 Forming 7 3 / 3 2 244 >35%
Gottingen 2 1 / 1 Cutting 12 7 / 7 3 184 25%-30%
Berlin 20 1.3 / 2.2 Cutting 1 1955 2 / 3 97 47 / 31 56 4464 0%-10%
Muenster 1 1 / 2 Cutting 2 1949-1951 1 / 1.5 10 4 / 3 4 170 10%-15%
Bielefeld 8 2.3 / 4.4 Cutting 42 26 / 21 15 304 15%-20%
Arnsberg 2 2 / 3.5 Cutting 18 7 / 5 10 138 15%-20%
Dortmund 7 4.4 / 12.6 Forming 15 8 / 5 5 1039 0%-10%
Duisburg / Essen 3 2.7 / 5.7 Forming 1 1956 1 / 1 28 10 / 6 9 687 0%-10%
Düsseldorf 102 1.7 / 3.8 Forming 6 1949-1953 1.5 / 3.2 237 112 / 77 128 956 0%-10%
Bochum / Hagen 37 2.1 / 3.7 Forming 1 1951 3 / 3 76 45 / 30 27 778 0%-10%
Cologne 20 2.2 / 4.8 Forming 62 29 / 17 30 531 10%-15%
Aachen 10 2.9 / 5 Forming 1 1949 1 / 1 18 11 / 9 7 237 0%-10%
Bonn 1 1 / 1 Cutting 1 1951 1 / 2 5 3 / 3 5 272 10%-15%
Siegen 15 2 / 3.8 Forming 38 29 / 27 9 175 10%-15%
Northern Hesse 2 1.5 / 1.5 Cutting 1 1949 1 / 4 22 12 / 7 7 140 15%-20%
Central Hesse 5 1.8 / 6 Forming 24 14 / 10 4 156 20%-25%
Eastern Hesse 1 1 / 1 Cutting 1 1 / 1 1 125 20%-25%
B. Planning Regions in the British Occupied Zone
Notes:  See above.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, continued
Incumbents Relocators from East Germany New entrants Region
Baseline Sample restricted Region choice Region choice
location choice to relocators that set restricted to set restricted to
estimation survive 10 years destinations with destinations that
in new region similar population border the
to true choice true choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Geographic distance to 0.942*** 0.921*** 0.532** -
destination region (0.253) (0.244) (0.225)
Dialect similarity of 0.828*** 0.972*** 0.515*** -
destination region (0.265) (0.285) (0.183)
Product similarity of -0.317 -0.277 -0.271 -0.431
destination region (0.343) (0.428) (0.255) (0.270)
Destination fixed effects YES YES YES YES
LR Chi Squared 17.13*** 17.24*** 15.81*** 2.56
Pseudo R Squared 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.03
Origin regions 10 9 10 10
Destination regions 63 63 43 44
Relocators 28 24 28 27
Observations 1,759 1,507 308 154
Notes:  Table reports conditional logit models for the location choice of West German regions by relocating firms from 
East Germany.  Regressors measure the geographic distance, dialect similarity, and industrial product similarity of the 
relocator's origin region in East Germany (pre-war) and the potential destination region in West Germany (post-war).  
Greater geographic distance and greater dialect similarity were the dominant factors in relocation decisions.  Existing 
industrial structures in West Germany were not an important factor in decisions.  The base location choice sample 
includes 28 relocating firms after relocators from Silesia are excluded due to data constraints on pre-war industrial 
conditions in Silesia.  These excluded relocators are included in the hazard models of Tables 3-5.  Column 2 restricts the 
sample to the 24 relocators that survived at least 10 years at their new location.  Column 3 restricts the set of potential 
destination regions to the actual destination region plus ten counterfactuals most similar in population size.  Column 4 
restricts the set of potential destination regions to the actual destination region plus regions that border it.  The relocation 
to Berlin is excluded from this sample due to lack of neighboring regions outside of the Soviet zone.  Regressions are 
unweighted and bootstrap standard errors.  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Table 2: Location choice for relocators from East Germany
Baseline Restricting Restricting Baseline Restricting Restricting
hazard model entrant counts entrant counts hazard model entrant counts entrant counts
of incumbent to firms surviving to firms surviving of incumbent to firms surviving to firms surviving
failure for five years for ten years failure for five years for ten years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm count of relocators 1.248* 1.314* 1.352* 1.172* 1.185* 1.190*
to incumbent's region (0.132) (0.163) (0.208) (0.100) (0.114) (0.117)
Firm count of new entrants 0.993** 0.982** 0.971*** 0.993 0.986 0.982
in incumbent's region (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.016)
Incumbent's product 0.824*** 0.824*** 0.823*** 0.827*** 0.827** 0.827**
count in 1949 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product class fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subjects 394 394 394 394 394 394
Failures 316 316 316 316 316 316
Observations 12,041 12,041 12,041 12,041 12,041 12,041
Notes:  Table reports Cox hazard models for incumbent failure/death in West German regions.  Explanatory factors for incumbent failure are relocating firms from East 
Germany and new start-up entrants.  Relocating firms consistently increase incumbent hazard of failure, while start-up entrants do not.  Estimations control for 
incumbent product counts in 1949 (i.e., firm size) and fixed effects for region, product class, and time period.  Reported coefficients are relative to a value of one, with 
coefficients greater than one signifying increased hazard of firm failure.  Estimations quantify the strengths of relocations and entrants with simple firm counts.  The 
first column considers all entrants.  The second and third columns restrict entrants to high-quality firms that survive five and ten years, respectively.  The fourth through 
sixth columns consider entry before 1956, which is the date of the last relocation from East Germany.  The sample includes incumbent firms from 40 West German 
regions.  After World War II, 31 relocating firms moved from East Germany to 15 of these regions.  Estimations are unweighted and cluster standard errors by planning 
region.  Wald tests for all estimations are significant at the 1% level.  ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3:  Incumbent hazard models with firm counts
Restricting to entrants before 1956
Baseline Restricting Restricting Baseline Restricting Restricting
hazard model entrant counts entrant counts hazard model entrant counts entrant counts
of incumbent to firms surviving to firms surviving of incumbent to firms surviving to firms surviving
failure for five years for ten years failure for five years for ten years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Product count of relocators 1.155** 1.189*** 1.215*** 1.152** 1.182** 1.192**
to incumbent's region (0.066) (0.068) (0.074) (0.070) (0.097) (0.102)
Product count of new entrants 0.993** 0.984*** 0.974* 0.987* 0.975 0.968
in incumbent's region (0.003) (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.016) (0.020)
Incumbent's product 0.824*** 0.823*** 0.823*** 0.827*** 0.827** 0.827**
count in 1949 (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product class fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subjects 394 394 394 394 394 394
Failures 316 316 316 316 316 316
Observations 12,041 12,041 12,041 12,041 12,041 12,041
Table 4:  Incumbent hazard models with firm product counts
Notes:  See Table 3.  Estimations quantify the strengths of relocations and entrants with the product counts of firms.  These product counts are the best available 
measure of firm size.  Relocating firms consistently increase incumbent hazard of failure, while start-up entrants do not.
Restricting to entrants before 1956
Full sample Moderate Moderate density Full sample Moderate Moderate density
using all population density and entrants using all population density and entrants
entrants using all entrants before 1956 entrants using all entrants before 1956
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
x weak expellee growth 1.483* - - 1.170* - -
for region workforce (0.269) (0.104)
x moderate expellee growth 1.059*** 1.076** 1.048* 1.062*** 1.079*** 1.064***
for region workforce (0.022) (0.037) (0.029) (0.015) (0.026) (0.021)
x high expellee growth 0.917 1.004 0.845 0.961 1.027 0.947
for region workforce (0.082) (0.121) (0.119) (0.045) (0.072) (0.071)
Strength of new entrants in 0.991** 0.985* 1.001 0.993** 0.988** 0.994
incumbent's region (0.004) (0.008) (0.031) (0.003) (0.006) (0.019)
Incumbent's product 0.824*** 0.741*** 0.745*** 0.824*** 0.741*** 0.746***
count in 1949 (0.065) (0.075) (0.078) (0.065) (0.075) (0.078)
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product class fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subjects 394 180 394 394 180 180
Failures 316 134 316 316 134 134
Observations 12,041 5,757 12,041 12,041 5,757 5,757
Table 5:  Incumbent hazard models with labor force differentials as resource constraints
Hazard models using raw firm counts to measure Hazard models using product capacity to measure
strength of relocations and entry (Table 3) strength of relocations and entry (Table 4)
Notes:  See Tables 3 and 4.  Estimations quantify the importance of labor resource constraints on how the relocating firms impact incumbent survival.  The strength of 
relocations are interacted with indicator variables for low, medium, and high expellee growth of workforce after the war.  These expellees exogenously increased the size 
of the local workforce.  Low shares are [0,10%], medium shares are (10%, 20%], and high shares are those greater than 20%.  Effects are estimated independently for 
each group (i.e., there is no excluded group).  The first three columns measure the strength of relocations and entry using firm counts similar to Table 3.  The second three 
columns measure strength of relocations and entry using product counts of firms similar to Table 4.  Within each triplet, the second column restricts the sample to regions 
with moderate population densities and the third column further restricts to entrants before 1956.  Relocating firms consistently increase incumbent hazard of failure in 
regions where labor supplies are constrained, but not in regions also experiencing a sharp increase in workforce growth.  Estimations are unweighted and cluster standard 
errors by planning region.  Wald tests for all estimations are significant at the 1% level.  ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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